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Abstract 
This paper examines exchange rate regimes from the viewpoint of the validity of purchasing power parity (PPP). 
Specifically, we analyze real exchange rate behavior under various classifications of exchange rate arrangement 
through panel unit root tests, and also investigate the adjustment speed of nominal exchange rate and relative prices 
separately through an error correction framework. Our findings are as follows: First, as a result of the panel unit root 
tests on real exchange rate behavior, industrial countries under “free float” reveal REER stability even though the test 
results show weak support for this speculation, while developing countries under “hard peg” definitely represent the 
REER stability, and have full support from the tests. Second, error correction analysis tells us that in industrial 
countries under “free float,” the adjustment of nominal exchange rate was faster than that of relative prices, while in 
developing countries under “hard peg” the adjustment of relative prices is faster that that of the nominal exchange rate. 
We speculate that industrial countries under free float may render exchange rate movements sensitive to the inflation 
gap, and that developing countries under “hard peg” may produce nonlinear price adjustments toward the REER long-
run equilibrium through an anchor-effect of peg on price stabilization.
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1. Introduction 
Exchange rate management is one of the central issues of macroeconomic policies. Since the 
postwar period, a lengthy debate has simmered over the merits of fixed versus floating exchange 
rates. The debate, which is typically framed in terms of the trade-off between credibility and 
flexibility, has gone through several swings of the pendulum (see Frankel 1999, and Frankel et al. 
2000). 
Recently, the debates on exchange rate regimes have become focused on whether the 
intermediate regimes that “soft peg” their currencies, by tactics such as target zones, crawling, and 
basket pegs, are vanishing. In other words, the question is whether exchange rate regimes are 
moving toward a corner solution with the “hard peg” approach or the “free float” one. The corner 
solutions hypothesis claims that, under the principle of the “impossible trinity,” countries will be 
increasingly forced toward more purely floating or more purely fixed regimes as capital market 
integration increases (see Fischer 2001, and Summers 1999). As a counter-argument against the 
corner solutions hypothesis, the “fear of floating” hypothesis justifies an intermediate exchange rate 
regime mainly from the viewpoint of establishing credibility in the financial markets so that the 
local currency will not lose value against foreign currencies, particularly among emerging market 
economies (see Calvo and Reinhart 2000, Williamson 2000, and Kawai 2002). So far, no clear 
consensus has been reached. 
The 1997-98 Asian financial crisis has refocused attention on exchange rate management within 
the East Asian countries. Most views expressed criticize the pre-crisis US-dollar-pegged rate regime 
as one cause of the crisis. It is said that this regime induced short-term external over-borrowing and 
caused the appreciation of real exchange rates with the loss of competitiveness (see Ito 2001, etc.). 
The question also arises as to whether, after the crisis, the East Asian countries are simply returning 
to the pre-crisis US dollar standard (see McKinnon 2001), or whether they have learned a lesson 
from the crisis and are finding another path to follow (see Kawai 2002, etc.). 
The recent debates over the exchange rate regimes take it a step further, arguing that there must 
be coordination in selecting an exchange rate regime among countries in the region with similar 
trading structures and with high intra-regional trading shares (see Ogawa and Ito 2000). The 
possibility of an optimal currency area in East Asia has also been discussed on an empirical basis 
(see Bayoumi, Eichengreen, and Mauro 2000). 
Among the literature on exchange rate regimes mentioned above, this paper examines exchange 
rate regimes from the viewpoint of the validity of purchasing power parity (PPP). The main 
questions are these: under which exchange rate regimes has PPP held? And, if some regimes allow 
PPP to hold, which adjustments of exchange rate or relative price have been effective in keeping 
PPP? 
In the following sections we will first review previous studies and clarify this paper’s position 
(Section 2). We will then present our own empirical study (Section 3), and end with some 
concluding remarks (Section 4). 
 
2. Previous Studies, Our Position  2
There is now a vast body of literature on the validity of purchasing power parity (PPP). Within 
this immense body of work, professional opinion on both the short and long run appears to have 
shifted several times in the post-war period. Taylor (2003) provides a selective and critical review 
of the literature, with special reference to the literature of the past two decades. As Dornbusch and 
Krugman (1976) wrote: “Under the skin of any international economist lies a deep-seated belief in 
some variant of the PPP theory of exchange rate.” Subsequently, the flurry of empirical studies 
employing unit-root tests on real exchange rate data for verifying the validity of the PPP—which 
emerged toward the end of the 1980s—were unanimous in their failure to reject the unit-root 
hypothesis (e.g., Enders 1998, Taylor 1988 and Mark 1990). Then, Frankel (1986, 1990) pointed out 
that the tests typically employed to examine the long-run stability of the real exchange rate—if  
based on data covering just 15 years or so—may have very limited power to reject the null 
hypothesis. A logical next phase of the analysis of long-run real exchange rates involved testing for 
mean reversion using long spans of data to increase the power of the tests. Using annual data from 
1869 to 1984 for the dollar-sterling real exchange rate, Frankel (1986) estimated an AR(1) process 
for the real rate and was able to reject the random-walk hypothesis. An alternative approach to 
increase the power of the tests involved using a panel of data; i.e., data on more than one real 
exchange rate. Abuaf and Jorion (1990) examined a system of ten first-order autoregressive 
regressions for real dollar exchange rates over the period 1973–87 and indicated a rejection of the 
null hypothesis of joint non-mean reversion as evidence in favor of long-run PPP. 
In the course of the literature above for verifying the validity of PPP, this paper can be classified 
into an empirical study that employs unit-root tests on a panel of real exchange rate data. The main 
contribution of this paper lies in the point where it conducts the panel unit-root tests on real 
exchange rates according to exchange rate regimes such as hard peg, soft peg, managed float, and 
free float, i.e. the empirical link between exchange rate regimes and behavior of real exchange rates 
using a large panel of countries in the world. We find few studies in which the behavior of real 
exchange rate arrangement is examined under various exchange rate arrangements in a world-wide 
level, although these kinds of studies are often found on specific countries and areas. Among them, 
Parsley and Popper (2001) found important differences in real exchange rate behaviors across 
various official designations of exchange rate arrangement on a world-wide level, and showed 
notably that real exchange rate mean reversion is fastest when nominal exchange rates are officially 
pegged, and that nominal exchange rates, rather than prices, do most of the adjusting.   
The new contributions of this study, which are different from Parsley and Popper (2001), are as 
follows. First, this study uses de facto exchange rate arrangements estimated by Reinhart and 
Ilzetzki (2009), while Parsley and Popper (2001) use the one reported in the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). Second, the estimations in this study are based on monthly data of the International 
Financial Statistics of the IMF and monthly estimates of exchange rate arrangements by Reinhart 
and Ilzetzki (2009), while Parsley and Popper (2001) estimate on annual base. Third, a large panel 
of countries in the world is divided between industrial countries and developed ones in this study’s 
estimation, although not in Parsley and Popper (2001). Fourth, this study adopts various types of the 
panel unit root tests with both common unit root process and individual unit root processes, while  3
                                                 
Parsley and Popper (2001) adopts only the tests with individual unit root processes of Im, Pesaran, 
and Shin (2003) and Maddala and Wu (1999). 
 
3. Empirical Studies 
We will now proceed to the empirical analysis, which we’ll take in two steps. First, we will 
conduct the panel unit-root tests to examine the stationarity of the real exchange rate according to 
exchange rate arrangements during the post-Bretton Woods period on the member-countries of the 
International Monetary Fund. Second, we will use an error correction framework to examine 
separately the adjustment of the nominal exchange rate and of relative prices, in case the stationarity 
of the real exchange rate is identified under some of exchange rate arrangements. 
 
3.1 Data 
We first clarify the data for the real exchange rate and the classification of exchange rate 
arrangements. Since a country has many trade partners and competitors in the world, the bilateral 
real exchange rates are usually unified to obtain a single indicator of a country’s international price 
competitiveness as the real effective exchange rate (REER). We will take the REER data from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) for the IMF member-countries during the post-Bretton 
Woods period: the monthly data from March 1973
1 to December 2007. There are two kinds of 
REER: the one based on unit labor costs and the other based on consumer price indices. Since the 
former are computed only for 18 industrial countries and the euro area, we use the latter, which are 
computed for almost all Fund members.
2 
As for the classification of exchange rate arrangements, the IMF represents it for the Fund 
members. However, its classification is often criticized as the one that does not necessarily reflect 
actual exchange rate arrangements, since it is based on the Fund member’s formally announced 
regime. Many economists, therefore, have often showed their own analysis of the de facto exchange 
rate regimes. One famous estimate on exchange rate arrangements is the one represented by 
Reinhart and Ilzetzki (2009), which reclassified exchange rate regimes by employing newly 
complied monthly data sets on market-determined exchange rates. From their estimates, we will 
adopt four categories of “monthly coarse classification,” which is composed of six categories of 
exchange rate arrangements. The first category consists of “no separate legal tender,” 
“pre-announced peg or currency board arrangement,” “pre-announced horizontal band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2%” and “  de facto peg,” which we will call “hard peg.” The second 
one is “pre- announced crawling peg,” “pre-announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal 
to +/-2%,” “de factor crawling peg,” and “de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to 
+/-2%,” which we will call “soft peg.” The third one is “pre-announced crawling band that is wider 
than or equal to +/-2%,” “de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%,” “moving 
 
1  The post-Bretton Woods period is said to have collapsed in March 1973, when most of the advanced nations in 
the world shifted their exchange rate arrangements to a floating system. 
2  The REER data of 134 of the 227 Fund members are not available in the IFS because its publication needs their 
approval.  4
                                                 
band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation 
over time),” and “managed float,” all of which we will call “managed floating.” The fourth one we 
will call “free float.” We will take the data during the post-Bretton Woods period: the monthly data 
from March 1973 to December 2007. 
Lastly, the classification of countries into industrial and developing ones follows the criteria of 
the IFS of the IMF. 
 
3.2 Panel unit root tests on the real exchange rate 
We step into the panel unit root tests on the real exchange rate under various classifications of 
exchange rate arrangements during the post-Bretton Woods period on the Fund members. We first 
clarify the procedures of panel unit root tests and then discuss the test results. 
 
3.2.1 Procedures of the panel unit root tests 
Recent literature suggests that panel-based unit root tests have higher power than unit root tests 
do, based on individual time series. We will adopt the following five types of panel unit root tests 
on the real exchange rate shown in the EViews 6 User’s Guide: Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), 
Breitung (2000), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), and Fisher-type tests using ADF and PP tests 
(Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001)).
3 The former two tests are the ones with common unit 
root process, where one can assume that the persistence parameters are common across 
cross-sections. On the other hands, the latter three tests are the ones with individual unit root 
processes, in which one can allow the persistence parameters vary freely across cross-sections. 
Since some criticizes the panel unit root tests with the null hypothesis of joint non-mean reversion,
4 
it might be not appropriate if we depended on the results of only one type of tests, thereby adopting 
five types of tests with two kinds: the tests with common unit root process and the ones with 
individual unit root processes. The method can choose to include individual constants, or to include 
individual constant and trend terms. 
To sum up, we will conduct the five types of panel unit root tests on the real effective exchange 
rate based on consumer price indices taken from the IFS, under the various kinds of the exchange 
rate arrangements represented by Reinhart and Ilzetzki (2009), in industrial and developing 
countries of the Fund members, during the post-Bretton Woods period. 
 
3.2.2 Discussion of the test results 
Table 1 shows the test results in the cases of full sample countries, industrial countries and 
developing countries. In the case of full samples, “hard peg” reveals the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of a unit root on REER in five types of tests with either intercept or trend and intercept 
 
3  The Guide includes one more test of Hadri (2000). This test is, however, said to over-reject the null of 
stationarity, and may yield results that directly contradict those obtained using alternative test statistics (see 
Hlouskova and Wagner (2006)). Therefore, we did not adopt the Hadri test here. 
4 For  example, Taylor (2003) told “if univariate unit-root tests applied to a set of real exchange rates lead to 
rejection of the null hypothesis of non-mean reversion for one or more of the rates, then the results of a panel 
unit-root test applied to the same group of exchange rates is completely uninformative.”  5
at the significance level of one, to five and ten percent. “Free float” does it in four tests, whereas 
“soft peg” and “managed float” do it in only one test. These test results appear to be ambiguous in 
full samples because the corner arrangements of “hard peg” and “free float” show more definitely 
the REER stationarity than the intermediate arrangements of “soft peg” and “managed float.” We, 
therefore, divide full samples into industrial countries and developing countries. 
In the case of industrial countries, “free float” gets the support of the REER stationarity from 
three tests, while the other arrangements get it from zero or only one test. In contrast, the case of 
developing countries shows that “hard peg” gets the support of the REER stationarity from all the 
tests, whereas the other arrangements get it from only one test. 
We may interpret the results above in the following way. There seems to be some contrast in the 
real exchange rate behavior under the corner arrangements between industrial countries and 
developing countries: industrial countries may possibly keep the REER stability by rendering 
exchange rate sensitive to relative prices under “free float.” The test results, however, show weak 
support for this speculation because the REER stationarity is identified in the panel unit root test not 
with a common unit root process but with individual ones and also at the significance level of not a 
one percent level but a five and ten percent level. On the other hands, developing countries 
definitely present the REER stability under “hard peg,” getting full support from five types of tests. 
The results seem to be consistent with the previous study of Parsley and Popper (2001), which 
showed that real exchange rate mean reversion is fastest when nominal exchange rates are officially 
pegged. The REER stability under “hard peg” may tempt us to speculate that price adjustments have 
worked under the condition that the nominal exchange rate is rigidly pegged. However, there may 
also be the possibility that countries have often revised their pegs. We will then examine which 
adjustments of nominal exchange rate or relative prices have been dominated to keep the REER 
stability under the error correction framework in the case of industrial countries under “free float” 
and developing countries under “hard peg” in the following section. The cases of industrial 
countries under “hard peg” and developing countries under “free float” are excluded from the 
following error correction analysis on price and exchange rate adjustment, because their cases could 
not identify the stationarity of the REER in the fore-mentioned panel unit root tests. 
 
3.3 Error correction analysis on price and exchange rate adjustment 
We now turn to error correction analysis to examine the adjustments of nominal exchange rate 
and relative prices towards the long-run REER stability. We first clarify the methodology of error 
correction model and then discuss the estimation result. 
 
3.3.1 The methodology of error correction model 
The real exchange rate can conceptually be divided into nominal exchange rate and relative 
prices. To be specific,   y of real exchange rate is divided into s of nominal exchange rate and p of 
relative prices. We will then examine nominal exchange rate and relative prices separately by using 
error correction equations. Specifically, we estimate: 
  6
Δsit = β1Δpit + β2 yit-1 + εsit 
Δpit = γ1Δsit + γ2 yit-1 + εpit                                                     ( 1 )  
 
where i are cross-section series, that are observed over periods t. In the estimation, we take the data 
for both real and nominal effective exchange rates from IFS, and obtain relative prices by dividing 
nominal effective exchange rate by real effective exchange rate. Each data is converted into 
logarithmic form. Our estimation focuses on the case of industrial countries under “Free Float” and 
developing countries under “Hard Peg” where the stationarity of real effective exchange rate 
(REER) was identified in the previous section. In this case, since nominal exchange rate and 
relative prices have their cointegrating relationship, the cointegration term of real exchange rate, β2 
yit-1 and γ2 yit-1 can be the error correction term. Then, the specification above can be interpreted in 
such a way that the long-run behavior of nominal exchange rate and relative prices converge to their 
cointegrating relationship of real exchange rate while their short-run adjustment dynamics are 
allowed; the deviation from long-run equilibrium is corrected gradually through a series of partial 
short-run adjustments. The coefficient of interest, β2 and γ2 measures the speed of adjustment 
towards the long-run equilibrium of real exchange rate. A priori, we would expect negative sign in 
β2 and positive one in γ2. In case that β2 > γ2, the adjustment of nominal exchange rate is faster than 
that of relative prices toward the long-run equilibrium, and vice versa. 
 
3.3.2 Discussion of estimation results 
Table 2 reports the estimation results of the error correction model in the case of industrial 
countries under “free float” and of developing countries under “hard peg.” In all the cases, the 
coefficients of β2 and γ2—the adjustment speeds of nominal exchange rate and relative prices—are 
of the correct sign and significant. In the case of industrial countries under “free float,” the 
estimated response of nominal exchange rate is -0.0111, while that of relative prices is 0.0027. Thus, 
the adjustment of the nominal exchange rate is much faster that that of relative prices. On the 
contrary, in the case of developing countries under “hard peg,” the estimated response of the 
nominal exchange rate is -0.0151, while that of relative prices is 0.0267. This means that the 
adjustment of relative prices is faster that that of nominal exchange rate. 
The contrast in the estimation results above seems to be interpreted as follows. The estimation 
results for industrial countries under “free float,” under which the exchange rate movement appears 
to be promptly responsive to the inflation gap. On the other hand, the estimation outcome for 
developing countries under “hard peg” may necessitate careful consideration because the outcome 
is different from that of Parsley and Popper (2001). This differing outcome revealed that the 
nominal exchange rate carries out the lion’s share of the adjustment across all of the exchange rate 
arrangements, including those classified as maintaining a peg. Parsley and Popper (2001) argued 
that the exchange rate adjustment under the peg suggests that countries revise their pegs in such a 
way that purchasing power parity calculations underlie official currency adjustments. Our results do 
not deny that argument, because the exchange rate response does exist by -0.0151 against the 
relative price response of 0.0267. We do speculate, however, that there seems to be another effect of  7
pegged exchange rate on prices. One alleged role of exchange rates is as an anchor of domestic 
price stability, which is based on the belief that pegging the exchange rate to a low-inflation 
currency would make domestic inflation come down rapidly through the restraint imposed on wage- 
and price-setting behavior (see Aghevli et al. 1991). In fact, the exchange-rate-based stabilization 
programs were undertaken in high inflation developing countries, including, for example, Chile 
(1978), Uruguay (1978), Argentina (1991), and Mexico (1987). These programs are said to have 
achieved success in bringing down inflation, with the case of Mexico being a typical example in 
which inflation was brought down by over a third in the first year of the program from an annual 
rate close to 160 percent (see IMF 1997). Thus, one interpretation on our estimation result can be 
that the price adjustment through an anchor-effect of peg on price stabilization might exceed the 
adjustment of peg-revision suggested by Parsley and Popper (2001) in developing countries 
suffering from high inflation. 
The verification of nonlinearity in the price-adjustment processes may help support our 
interpretation. When the real exchange rate deviates greatly from the long-run equilibrium, the price 
adjustment might be fastest through the enforcement of the exchange-rate-based stabilization 
programs under a scenario of high inflation. On the other hand, a small deviation might prevent the 
price adjustment in the presence of transaction costs. We will then represent the nonlinearity by 
multiplying the lagged deviation by its absolute value, which preserves sign changes. The modified 
error correction equation (1) now becomes: 
 
Δpit’= γ1’Δsit + γ2’ yit-1 | yit-1 |+ εpit                                               ( 2 )  
 
We can verify the nonlinearity in the price-adjustment, in case the coefficient of interest, γ2’ is 
significantly negative. Table 3 indicates that γ2’ is of the correct sign and significant, thereby 
suggesting that the nonlinear price adjustment is an important aspect of movements in real exchange 
rates. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This article examined exchange rate regimes from the viewpoint of the validity of purchasing 
power parity (PPP). Specifically, we conducted the panel unit root tests to examine the stationarity 
of real exchange rates (which is tantamount to the validity of PPP) under various classifications of 
exchange rate arrangements during the post-Bretton Woods period on the member-countries of the 
International Monetary Fund. We further examined the adjustments of nominal exchange rate and 
relative prices separately by using an error correction framework. 
Our findings are as follows: First, as a result of the panel unit root tests on the real exchange rate 
behavior, industrial countries under “free float” reveal the REER stability, although the test results 
show weak support for this speculation. Developing countries under “hard peg,” in contrast, 
definitely represent the REER stability with full supports from the tests. Second, the error correction 
analysis tells us that in industrial countries under free float, the adjustment of nominal exchange rate 
was faster than that of relative prices, while in developing countries under hard peg the adjustment  8
of relative prices is faster that that of nominal exchange rate. We speculate that industrial countries 
under free float may render exchange rate movements sensitive to the inflation gap, and that 
developing countries under hard peg may produce a nonlinear price adjustment toward the REER 
long-run equilibrium through an anchor-effect of peg on price stabilization. Table 1 Panel Unit Root Tests of Real Effective Exchange Rates 
Full sample countires
Hard Peg Soft Peg Managed Float Free Float
Intercept       -2.21 **       -4.53 ***       -2.78 ***       -1.43 *
Trend & Intercept       -0.99       -1.31 *       -1.61 *        2.52
Intercept       -1.96 **        0.94       -0.36        0.32
Trend & Intercept        1.53        2.79        0.85       -0.14
Intercept       -1.28        0.70        0.40       -1.38 *
Trend & Intercept       -2.52 ***        2.31         1.26       -0.28
Intercept      151.14 ***      116.38      100.79       37.67 *
Trend & Intercept      197.87 ***       84.00       85.72       25.29
Intercept      142.24 **      110.17       91.09       54.03 ***
Trend & Intercept      160.30 ***       86.10       68.96       32.07
Sample 9,756 7,787 5,995 1,758
Industrial countires
Hard Peg Soft Peg Managed Float Free Float
Intercept        0.52       -0.27       -0.68       -1.10
Trend & Intercept       -0.42        0.17       -0.81       -0.42
Intercept       -1.80 **       -0.50       -2.13 **        0.07
Trend & Intercept        2.46       -0.26        0.72       -0.50
Intercept        1.09        0.06       -0.46       -1.86 
**
Trend & Intercept        1.37        2.04       -0.19        0.02
Intercept       22.07       26.53       23.15       14.83 *
Trend & Intercept       18.69       19.72       25.81        5.98
Intercept       20.26       23.81       20.27       15.09 *
Trend & Intercept       16.70       16.77       21.76        6.39
Sample 2,880 2,606 1,727 1,223
Developing countires
Hard Peg Soft Peg Managed Float Free Float
Intercept       -3.00 ***       -4.72 ***       -2.74 ***       -0.77
Trend & Intercept       -0.92       -1.65 **       -1.49 *        4.06  
Intercept       -1.32 *        1.12        0.25        0.79
Trend & Intercept       -0.72        3.37        0.57        0.75  
Intercept       -2.10 **        0.78        0.73       -0.45
Trend & Intercept       -3.52 ***        1.52        1.53       -0.33
Intercept      129.07 ***       89.84       77.64        22.83
Trend & Intercept      179.17 ***       64.28       59.91        19.30
Intercept      121.98 ***       86.36       70.82       38.94 ***
Trend & Intercept      143.60 ***       69.33       47.20        25.68
Sample 6,876 5,181 4,268 535
2) ***, **, and * indicate rejection of the null of nonstationarity at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance 
   levels with critical values.
Im, Pesaran and Shin
Fisher - ADF
Fisher - ADF
Levin, Lin and Chu






Levin, Lin and Chu
Im, Pesaran and Shin
Fisher - ADF
Fisher - PP




Table 2 Error Correction Estimates 
Relative Prices Error Correction Term  Nominal Exchange Rate  Error Correction Term 
β1 β2 γ1 γ2
Developing Countries under "Hard Peg"
  Coefficient 0.4973 -0.0151 0.3825 0.0267
  Standard Error 0.0125 0.0022 0.0096 0.0019
  t-statistic 39.8486 -6.7842 39.8486 13.8354
 Wu-Hausman Test
   Chi-Sq.
   Chi-Sq. d.f.
   Prob.
   Type 
Industrial Countries under "Free Float"
  Coefficient 0.1679 -0.0111 0.0155 0.0027
  Standard Error 0.0940 0.0028 0.0085 0.0013
  t-statistic 1.7857 -3.9576 1.8199 2.0333
 Wu-Hausman Test
   Chi-Sq.
   Chi-Sq. d.f.
   Prob.
   Type 
Δs it = β1Δp it + β2 yit -1 + ε sit










Random Fixed  
 
Table 3 Nonlinear Error Correction Estimates: Relative prices   
γ1’ γ2’
Developing Countries under "Hard Peg"
  Coefficient 0.3837 0.0028
  Standard Error 0.0096 0.0002
  t-statistic 39.9123 13.2157
 Wu-Hausman Test
   Chi-Sq.
   Chi-Sq. d.f.
   Prob.
   Type  Fixed
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